An Overview of Sentencing for Juvenile Offenders: The Unconstitutional Imposition of Juvenile Life Without Parole Sentencing on Non-Homicide Offenders.

By Tristan T. Gardner

The second most severe penalty permitted by law is life without parole.[1] In the last two decades, there have been a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions that address the constitutionality of severe sentences imposed on juvenile offenders. Beginning in 2005, the court held that imposing the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 at the time of the offense was unconstitutional, violating both the 8th and 14th amendments.[2] Although this decision precluded the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed before the age of 18, juvenile offenders could still be sentenced to die in prison even if they did not kill or intend to kill. The article will address Juvenile Life Without Parole (JLWOP) and its implication on non-homicide juvenile offenders through an overview of Graham v. Florida.

In Graham, the Court concluded that “the constitution prohibits, the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide.”[3]The Court arrived at this conclusion by using a three - step analysis.[4]The first step of this analysis required the court to consider “objective indicia of society’s standards,” expressed in legislation and the sentencing practice of states, to determine whether there is a “national consensus against the sentencing practice at issue,” namely JLWOP.[5]In the second step, the court was required to “exercise its own independent judgment” to determine if imposing JLWOP is a constitutional violation.[6]  Lastly, the court analyzed whether penal theories justify the sentence.[7]

Considering “objective indicia of society’s standards,”  the Court relied on the states’ data presented in its brief, supplemented by the Court’s own findings.[8] In doing so, the Court found that there was only “124 juvenile non-homicide offenders serving life without parole sentences,” with 77 of those serving life without parole sentences in Florida and the “others imprisoned in just 10 states.”[9] Thus, the court concluded that there is a national consensus against JLWOP.[10] Acknowledging that a national consensus is “entitled to great weight” but not dispositive, the Court moved to the “independent judgment” step, which requires “consideration of the offender’s culpability at issue in light of their crimes and characteristics, along with the severity of the punishment in question.”[11]

Here, the Court relies on “developmental differences between juvenile and adult minds” to prove that the cruel actions of a minor are not equal to that of an adult.[12]The Court focuses on the human brain: “parts of the brain involved in behavior control continue to mature throughout late adolescents.”[13]Thus, juveniles are more likely to change their character than adults, which makes them less culpable for their actions.[14]The nature of the offense at issue is also considered in this analysis.[15]Non-homicide crimes, the Court notes, are “less deserving” of the severest punishments than are homicide crimes.[16]Therefore, it follows that when a juvenile offender commits a non-homicide crime, they have a “twice diminished moral culpability” – their age and the nature of the crime.[17] Furthermore, life without parole is a harsh penalty for any offender and an even harsher penalty for juveniles.[18]Imposing this punishment on a juvenile offender conveys a “‘denial of hope,’” and means that juveniles will spend the vast majority of their life in prison with no chance of re-entering society.[19]

In examining the penological goals pursued by this punishment, the Court established that none of them justify a JLWOP sentence imposed on juvenile non-homicide offenders.[20]Starting with the penological goal of retribution, the Court first stated that it is essential to retribution for the sentence imposed on an offender to be “directly related” to their culpability.[21]Since JLWOP is the second most severe penalty and minors are less culpable for their actions than adults, retribution is not as strong of a case for minors.[22]Therefore, the goal of retribution is not a justifiable reason to impose life without parole on juvenile non-homicide offenders.[23]Juveniles are also less susceptible to deterrence due to their “lack of maturity” and “underdeveloped sense of responsibility” that sometimes result in irrational behaviors and decisions.[24]Pursuing the goal of incapacitation as justification for JLWOP requires the assumption that the offender will be a risk to society for the remainder of his life.[25]This judgment, from the outset, implies that the juvenile offender is incorrigible.[26]However, the developmental reasons listed above renders this judgment doubtful.[27] Lastly, the Court states that JLWOP renounces the idea of rehabilitation.[28] Life in prison for a juvenile offender denies them the right to reenter the community and implies an irrevocable judgment about that person’s value and place in society.” [29]

The Court has pronounced a bright-line rule for imposing life without parole on juvenile non-homicide offenders.[30] This sentencing practice is constitutionally cruel and unusual and has no place in our criminal justice system. The national consensus against this sentencing practice supports its prohibition. Because of their lessened culpability, juvenile non-homicide offenders are undeserving of the harshest penalties and no penological theory justifies this punishment. This holding does not mean that the Court declares juvenile offenders absolved from punishment of their crimes. Rather, it means that a juvenile non-homicide offender must be given “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”[31]

[1] Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 69 (2010).

[2] Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).

[3] Graham, 560 U.S.at 82.

[4] Id. at 61.

[5]Id.

[6] Id.

[7] Id. at 71.

[8] Id. at 62-67.

[9] Graham, 560 U.S. at 64.

[10] Id. at 67.

[11] Id.

[12] Id. at 68.

[13] Id.

[14] Id.

[15] Graham, 560 U.S. at 69.

[16]Id.

[17] Id.

[18] See id. at 70

[19] Id. (quoting Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944, 944 (Nev. 1989)).

[20] Graham, 560 U.S. at 74.

[21] Id. at 71.

[22] See id.

[23] Id. at 72.

[24] Id.

[25] Id.

[26] Graham, 560 U.S. at 72.

[27]See id.at 72-73.

[28] Id. at 74.

[29] See id. (explaining how offenders serving life without parole are not given the opportunity to engage in rehabilitative services that are afforded to other inmates and the denial of these services for JLWOP non-homicide offenders “makes the disproportionality of the sentence all more evident”).

[30] Id. at 75.

[31]Id.